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THE PENALTY RULE:  1  
A MODERN INTERPRETATION  
 




This paper focuses on the common law doctrine of the penalty rule 
and the recent Supreme Court decision in Cavendish Square Holding v 
Makdessi and Parking Eye v Beavis. The state of the penalty rule prior to 
the judgment was unsatisfactory and criticized by both commentators and 
practitioners alike. Its indiscriminate application and unclear criteria was a 
needless source of uncertainty for both contracting parties and lawyers. 
Nevertheless, their Lordships in Makdessi refused to abolish the penalty 
rule but acknowledged its limited application in the modern commercial 
context. This paper accordingly aims to justify the continued existence of 
the doctrine on theoretical grounds within the English private law 
framework despite its practical obsolescence.  
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Contract law lies at the heart of commercial law along with its central 
doctrines of freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda.2 An important 
aspect of the freedom of contract is that contractual parties may agree 
upon remedies in the event of a breach of contract. As Hugh Collins notes, 
“most written contracts…pay considerable attention to agreed remedies.”3 
A liquidated damages clause, a clause that quantifies the sum payable 
upon breach by the defaulting party, is a useful example of an agreed 
                                                 
 University of Oxford, University College London. 
1 As termed by the Supreme Court in Cavendish Square Holding v Makdessi 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373. The rule against penalties, and the penalties doctrine, will be 
used synonymously for the penalty rule.  
2 Roy Goode, Commercial Law in the Next Millennium (The Hamlyn Lectures 
Series, Sweet & Maxwell 1998) 31. 
3 Hugh Collins, The Law of Contract (4th edn, Cambridge University Press 2003) 
365. 
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remedy. Liquidated damages clauses serve various practical purposes: 
they reduce the uncertainties and expenses of pursuing damages under the 
default contract rules, allocate the risk of loss and allow parties to price 
the contract more accurately,4 and ensure that the innocent party receives 
a subjectively-satisfactory compensation that might not be recoverable in 
an ordinary action for damages due to proof of actual loss.  
In contrast the penalty rule is an impediment to liquidated damages 
and its underlying doctrine freedom of contract. The penalty rule applies 
on a breach of contract and renders an agreed remedy clause (traditionally 
a liquidated damages clause) to be a penalty and unenforceable. Because 
of its unprincipled application, the rule has been described as a “blatant 
interference with the freedom of contract”,5 impossible to rationalise,6 and 
a recipe for disaster.7  Nor has the longstanding debate over the rule 
waned. In the past decade, penalty clauses have been at the forefront of 
judicial discussion both in Australia and in the United Kingdom. In the 
United Kingdom, the issue of the penalty rule reached the Court of Appeal 
twice within two years and culminated in the Supreme Court decision of 
the joint appeals in Cavendish v El Makdessi (“Makdessi”) and 
ParkingEye v Beavis (“ParkingEye”) in November 2015.8   
 
3 THE PRESENT STUDY 
 
Whilst the Supreme Court in Makdessi explained the penalty rule to 
be based on public policy, their reasoning for continuing to uphold the 
rule (i.e. refusing to abolish the doctrine) is not entirely convincing. 
Specifically, Lords Neuberger and Sumption were doubtful that “the 
courts would have invented the rule today if their predecessors had not 
done so three centuries ago”.9 Such apprehension about the rule leads to 
questions over the precise purpose of the rule against penalties in contract 
law and the modern commercial world. 
                                                 
4 Samuel Rea, ‘Efficiency Implication of Penalties and Liquidated Damages’ 
[1984] Journal of Legal Studies 148. 
5 Makdessi v Cavendish Square Holdings [2013] EWCA Civ 1539 [44].  
6 Robophone Facilities Ltd v Blank [1966] 1 WLR 1428, 1446 (Diplock LJ). 
7 Sarah Worthington, ‘Common Law Values: The Role of Party Autonomy in 
Private Law’ in A Robertson and M Tilbury (eds), The Common Law of 
Obligations: Divergence and Unity (Hart Publishing 2015). 
8 Makdessi (CA) (n 5); ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] RTR 27. See also Andrews v 
Ausralia and New Zealand Banking Group [2012] HCA 30; Paciocco v Australia 
and New Zealand Banking Group [2015] FCAFC 50: Australian High Court 
(judgment pending).  
9 Makdessi (SC) (n 1) [36]. 
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This paper attempts to fill this void by providing a rationalisation of 
the “modern” penalty rule based on the Supreme Court judgment and 
developments in the past two decades. I assert that the major criticisms 
against the rule, namely uncertainty over when the rule operates,10 and its 
abrogation of party autonomy,11 are genuine but inconsequential concerns 
as the rule has been confined in its application since the late nineties and 
with the culmination of the recent Supreme Court decision has become all 
but symbolic especially within the commercial context (i.e. where neither 
party deals as a consumer).  
I consequently argue that the doctrine’s survival is justified since the 
penalty rule is consistent with other well-established principles within 
English private law and is best viewed as a constituent of a coherent and 
rational set of private law rules. Thus, not only would the abolishment of 
the penalty rule prove no more beneficial in practice for commercial 
parties, it would also lead to an anomalous and unnecessary contrast to 
principles within contract law and the law of unjust enrichment. 
The focus of this paper will be on the commercial context (although 
there will be discussions of the consumer case ParkingEye) as this is the 
area the rule is most relevant. Many standard contracts in various 
industries contain agreed damages clauses such as those in the 
construction industry (by the Joint Contracts Tribunal). The majority of 
recent case law concern also only commercial parties, a development 
largely attributable to the rise of consumer protection mechanisms such as 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (“UCTA”) and The Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (“UCCTR”) (both consolidated 
under the Consumer Rights Act 2015).  
The discussion will be threefold. Part I sets the scene with an 
examination of the Supreme Court decision in Makdessi. In particular, I 
discuss the reformulated two-stage test for determining a penalty, and 
their Lordship’s dismissal of “genuine pre-estimate” and “a sum in 
terrorem” as factors in the finding of a penalty clause. The concept of a 
“legitimate interest” points towards a high threshold for the finding of a 
penalty clause and serves as important judicial recognition that 
commercial parties often have an interest in enforcing the contract beyond 
simple financial compensation. I conclude with a discussion of the 
justifications offered against abolishing the doctrine.   
                                                 
10 R Halson, ‘Remedies for Breach of Contract’ in M Furmston et al (eds), 
Butterworths Common Law Series: The Law of Contract (4th edn, Butterworths 
Law 2007); Lucinda Miller, ‘Penalty Clauses in England and France: A 
Comparative Study’ [2004] International and Comparative Law Quarterly 79. 
11 Worthington (n 7).  
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Part II examines the penalty rule in in its modern form beginning with 
Colman J’s decision in Lordsdale Finance12 and its subsequent 
development. By demonstrating the rule’s consistently limited application 
in practice, criticisms against the rule are tempered. I examine the rare 
occasions that the courts made the finding of penalty clause and argue that 
this was due to a misunderstanding of the rule as it has developed since 
Lordsvale.13   
Part III puts forth my justification for the penalty rule and its modern 
role, elaborating on an argument introduced but not fully explored by the 
Supreme Court.14 I demonstrate that the penalty rule is consistent with 
other firmly established doctrines within English private law including the 
limited availability of specific performance and punitive damages as 
remedies, as well as the principle within the law of unjust enrichment that 
no party, even though innocent, should be allowed to unfairly enrich 
himself at the expense of another.  
 
4 PART I: MAKDESSI V CAVENDISH 
 
4.1 Facts and Background 
 
The state of the penalty rule prior to the Supreme Court decision was 
beyond unsatisfactory: Smith had described the penalty rule as 
“indiscriminate in effect and uncertain in application”15 and Whincup had 
considered it very difficult to say which clauses will be upheld and which 
will be rejected.16  When Clarke LJ in the Court of Appeal held the 
disputed clauses in Makdessi, clauses carefully negotiated by well-advised 
commercial parties, to be penalties, commentators were understandably 
equally critical of both the decision and of the penalty rule itself.17The 
appeals of Makdessi and ParkingEye were of disparate ilk: the former 
                                                 
12 Lordsvale Finance v Bank of Zambia [1996] QB 752. 
13 Jeancharm v Barnet Football Club [2003] EWCA Civ 58; County Leasing v 
East [2007] EWHC 2907 QB; Unaoil v Leighton Offshore [2014] EWHC 2965 
(Comm).  
14 Makdessi (SC) (n 1) [39]. 
15 Jonna Smith, ‘Penalty Clauses: Essential Protection or Anachronistic and 
Uncommercial?’ (Construction Law Conference, 2015)  
<http://www.whitepaperdocuments.co.uk/index.php?option=com_docman&task=
doc_download&gid=2665&Itemid=2> accessed 12 December 2015. 
16 Michael Whincup, Contract Law and Practice (5th edn, 2006 Kluwer) 369. 
17 Janet Sullivan, ‘Lost on Penalties’ [2014] CLJ 480; E Peel ‘Unjustified 
Penalties or an Unjustified Rule Against Penalties?’ [2014] Law Quarterly 
Review 365; W Day, ‘Penalty Clauses Revisited’ [2014] Journal of Business Law 
512.  
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concerned disputed clauses within a contract subject to extensive 
negotiations where both parties were advised by “very experienced 
lawyers”, whereas the latter case concerned a clause in a consumer 
contract. As Lord Mance aptly explains: the two cases lie at the “opposite 
ends of a financial spectrum”.18 The appeals were also the first time either 
the Supreme Court or House of Lords had considered the penalties 
doctrine in over a century and thus the decision serves as a new landmark 
for the penalty rule in English law. 
 
4.1.1 Facts of Cavendish 
 
Mr Makdessi was a key figure in the marketing world of the Middle 
East and the co-founder and majority shareholder of the largest 
advertising and marketing communications group in that region. Makdessi 
agreed to sell 47.4% of his shares in his company to Cavendish Holdings 
(a subsidiary of the world’s largest advertising company), and to certain 
restrictive covenants. The breach of such covenants (under clause 11, 
titled “Protection of Goodwill”) 19 disentitled Makdessi from receiving the 
final two instalments of the purchase price (clause 5.1), a substantial sum 
in the tens of millions, and required Makdessi to sell his remaining stake 
to Cavendish at a substantially reduced price, a value that excluded his 
goodwill to the business (clause 5.6).   
 
4.1.2 Facts of ParkingEye  
 
ParkingEye Ltd managed the car park at Riverside Retail Park in 
Chelmsford, Essex. Numerous “reasonably large, prominent and legible” 
signs reading “2 hour max stay… Failure to comply… will result in 
Parking Charge of £85” were displayed throughout the car park.20 Mr. 
Beavis, a local chip shop owner, overstayed by nearly an hour and argued 
that the £85 charge was unenforceable as a penalty at common law. Or 
that that the charge was unfair and unenforceable under the UTCCR. 
 
                                                 
18  Makdessi (SC) (n 1) [116].  
19 Cavendish Square Holdings v Makdessi [2012] EWHC 3582 (Comm) [4]: 11.1. 
Each Seller recognises the importance of the goodwill of the Group to the 
Purchaser and the WPP Group which is reflected in the price to be paid by the 
Purchaser for the Sale Shares. Accordingly, each Seller commits as set out in this 
Clause 11 to ensure that the interest of each of the Purchasers and the WPP Group 
in that goodwill is properly protected.’ (Italics supplied).  
20 ParkingEye (n 8) [2].  
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4.2 Criticism of the Dunlop Test  
 
The Supreme Court acknowledged and described the penalty rule to 
be an “ancient, haphazardly constructed edifice which has not weathered 
well…”21 For many years, the courts had struggled to apply standard tests 
formulated over a century ago, namely the four propositions set out by 
Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre v New Garage & Motor.22 Lord 
Dunedin’s second proposition has been relied upon the most by 
subsequent courts:  
 
The essence of a penalty is a payment of money stipulated as in 
terrorem of the offending party; the essence of liquidated damages 
is a genuine covenanted pre-estimate of damage.23 
 
The rigidness of this dichotomy has caused decades of difficulties for 
the judiciary. As Miller points out, Lord Dunedin’s second proposition 
assumes that an agreed damages clause is either liquidated damages or a 
penalty. Even where one function is more dominant than the other, it is 
not always the case that the other function is entirely absent (i.e. the two 
functions are not mutually exclusive). 24 For example, a clause may be a 
genuine pre-estimate, but it may still have an element of deterrence, even 
if to a lesser extent. Similarly determining whether a clause is a penalty on 
the concepts of “in terrorem” and genuine pre-estimate is obfuscating, 
since a party may not be the least terrorised by the prospect of having to 
pay an exorbitant fee upon breach but under the old test, may well be 
entitled to protection from the courts. Miller considered classification 
under this test as potentially “misleading”.25  
A related problem emerges from this timeworn distinction. The two 
disputed clauses in Makdessi were restrictive covenants and certainly 
much more complex than what Lord Dunedin may have contemplated in 
his time.  The breach of the two clauses would have deprived the obligor 
Makdessi, tens of millions of dollars in value, but the immediate loss 
stemming from the loss would have been minimal for Cavendish. 
Nevertheless the loss of goodwill resulting from the breach of the clauses 
was of great importance to Cavendish and the value of the marketing 
                                                 
21 Makdessi (SC) (n 1) [3].  
22 [1915] AC 79. 
23 Ibid 86; Modern cases have preferred “intended to deter” as opposed to 
“stipulated as in terrorem”. 
24 Miller (n 10) 82.  
25 Ibid.  
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company, and would have been very difficult to assess.26 A decade earlier 
Mance LJ (as he then was) acknowledged the problem that the penalty 
rule’s premise on a strict dichotomy between genuine pre-estimate and a 
penalty could not possibly cover all possibilities of clauses operating upon 
breach. 27 
The Supreme Court in Makdessi agreed that the penalty rule had 
become the prisoner of artificial categorisation, a result of the 
unsatisfactory distinctions between penalty and genuine pre-estimate, and 
a genuine pre-estimate and a deterrent. Confirming Miller’s analysis, 
Lords Neuberger and Sumption held that a penalty and a genuine pre-
estimate are not natural opposites or mutually exclusive categories and 
that whether a contractual provision is a penalty is whether it is penal, and 
not whether it is a pre-estimate of loss.28 
 
4.3 The Reformulated Test: “Legitimate Interest” 
 
Whilst Lord Dunedin’s traditional four tests in Dunlop remains useful 
for straightforward cases of agreed damages (i.e. a clause stipulating a 
fixed sum payable upon breach), it had otherwise become too rigid and 
unfortunately had been treated in a quasi-statutory manner, something that 
Lord Dunedin himself never intended. The majority held the new test for 
ascertaining whether a contractual provision was penal to be: 
 
…whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation 
which imposes a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all 
proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party in the 
enforcement of the primary obligation”29   
 
Lords Mance and Hodge provided differently worded tests to the same 
substantive effect.30 There are two ascertainable elements to the test: 
firstly, whether one contracting party has a legitimate interest in enforcing 
the primary obligation of the other party, and secondly, whether the 
detriment to the latter party is out of all proportion to such an interest. The 
concepts of genuine pre-estimate of loss and deterrence that had once 
been at the heart of the rule are notably absent.  
                                                 
26 Makdessi (CA) (n 5) [109].  
27 Cine Bes Filmcilik v UIP [2004] 1 CLC 401 [15]. 
28 Makdessi (SC) (n 1), [31] (Lords Neuberger and Sumption) [152] (Lord 
Mance).  
29 Ibid [32].  
30 Ibid [152] (Lord Mance) [255] (Lord Hodge); See also [293] (Lord Toulson).  
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It was emphasised that the penalty rule was only applicable to 
secondary obligations. This distinction in practice however may prove 
difficult to delineate and even in Makdessi there was disagreement over 
whether clause 5.6 constituted a primary or secondary obligation. Lords 
Hodge and Clarke, contrary to the majority believed the clause to be a 
primary obligation but kept an “open mind” over clause 5.1.31  There is 
indeed still a degree of uncertainty and certainly scope for future litigation 
over this distinction.32  
Nonetheless the wording suggests a high standard for a successful 
invocation of the penalty rule. We might contrast this wording directly 
with another of Lord Dunedin’s proposition from Dunlop that “a clause 
will be held to be a penalty if the sum stipulated for is extravagant and 
unconscionable in comparison with the greatest loss that could 
conceivably be proved.” 33 The new legitimate interest element requires 
courts to take into account why a party might seek to enforce the clause as 
opposed to concentrating solely on whether the clause was a genuine pre-
estimate. Their Lordships pointed towards Dunlop itself as an example: a 
sum of £5 was stipulated for the sale of each tire in breach of the 
agreement was incommensurate with the actual loss suffered from the sale 
of one tire, but was not incommensurate with the wider interest that 
Dunlop had in enforcing the damages clause. Indeed, their Lordships 
believed this broader interpretation to be the best way of explaining 
Dunlop.34  Lord Mance, comparing Dunlop with Makdessi, held that in 
each case, “the focus should be on the overall picture, not on the 
individual breaches”.35 An isolated reading of the new test, where a clause 
will be a penalty only where its enforcement is “out of all proportion” to 
any legitimate interest, ceteris paribus, is prima facie tougher for the party 
seeking relief than it traditionally was under Lord Dunedin’s formulation.  
More telling are the dicta of the Supreme Court Justices. The majority 
judgment affirmed passages by Diplock LJ from Robophone that the court 
should not be eager to make the finding of a penalty clause, and Lord 
Woolf in Philips Hong Kong that any stringent approach would lead to 
undesirable uncertainty.36 Where both parties are properly advised and of 
comparable bargaining power, their Lordships believed there to be a 
strong initial presumption that the parties themselves are the best judges 
                                                 
31 Ibid [270] (Lord Hodge), [291] (Lord Clarke).  
32 J Smith and M McCreath, ‘No Penalty? Cavendish v Makdessi: The Rule 
Against Penalties Redefined’ [2016] CRI 3.  
33 Dunlop (n 22) 87.  
34 Makdessi (SC) (n 1) [22].  
35 Ibid [172]. 
36 Ibid [33].  
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of what is legitimate in provisions dealing with the consequences of a 
breach.37 Lord Hodge remarked that “judges should be modest in their 
assumptions that they know about business”, and acknowledged that there 
were real benefits in allowing parties to agree the consequences of a 
breach of contract.38 
The Supreme Court definitively refused to follow its Australian 
counterpart in Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking in holding 
that the penalty rule could apply without the requirement of a breach of 
contract.39 For our purposes it is important to note that the decision 
refusing to follow Andrews was influenced by the fear that an expansion 
of the court’s supervisory jurisdiction (into what has always been 
governed by mutual agreement) would lead to uncharted areas of 
uncertainty.40 Again we can see evidence of the judiciary’s desire for legal 
certainty, a theme prevalent in the judgment.  
 
4.4 Application to the facts 
 
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the clauses in both cases, 
affirming the Court of Appeal’s decision in ParkingEye and overruling its 
decision in Makdessi.  
 
4.4.1 Makdessi v Cavendish  
 
The majority believed clause 5.1 to be a price adjustment clause and 
“in no sense a secondary provision”, and that in this particular case was 
outside the jurisdiction of the penalties doctrine.41 Whilst the withholding 
of the interim and final payments in clause 5.1 had no relationship to the 
measure of damages arising from the breach (and would have been 
disproportionate as a genuine pre-estimate), it was believed that 
Cavendish had a legitimate interest in the observance of the restrictive 
covenants which extended beyond the recovery from the breach of clause 
11. The fact that the breach of clause 11 would cause very little in the way 
of recoverable loss to Cavendish was considered “beside the point”.42 In 
reaching said conclusion, Lords Neuberger and Sumption emphasised that 
                                                 
37 Makdessi (SC) (n 1) [35] (Italics supplied).  
38 Ibid [259]. 
39 Ibid [34]. See also [130] (Lord Mance’s lone dissent).  
40 Ibid [42].  
41 Ibid [74].  
42 Ibid [75]. 
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the parties on both sides were “sophisticated, successful and experienced 
commercial people bargaining on equal terms with expert legal advice.”43    
Clause 5.6 which required the transfer of Makdessi’s remaining shares 
at a reduced price was similarly justified by the same legitimate interest 
behind clause 5.1. The court was notably attuned the business rationale 
behind the clause: their Lordships explained that since Makdessi’s efforts 
and connections were no longer available to the company and would be 
applied to benefit the company’s competitors, there was a strong case for 
Cavendish to pay a price for the remainder of the shares net the value of 
Makdessi’s goodwill.44  
 
4.5 ParkingEye v Beavis  
 
The Supreme Court equally held the parking fine of £85 in 
ParkingEye not to be a penalty. It decided that there was a legitimate 
interest on the part of the park management to enforce the fee for 
overstaying beyond the two hours, and that £85 was not out of all 
proportion to this interest. The interest of enforcing the clause, the Court 
held, was a key part of the entire car park scheme: to make efficient use of 
parking space for the retail outlets and to use the proceeds from the charge 
as an income stream towards operating profits.45 The Court further 
reached the conclusion that £85 was not disproportionate whilst 
referencing the maximum charge of £100 set by the British Parking 
Association and the fact that many motorists use the car park aware of the 
charge. The widespread usage of such a payment structure and level of 
charge in the UK further supported the conclusion that the clause in 
question was not a penalty.46  
 
4.6 Justifications against Abolishment or Restrictions 
 
Whilst counsel for Cavendish argued “with considerable forensic 
skill” for the abolishment of the penalty rule,47 the Supreme Court 
unanimously rejected Cavendish’s primary and secondary submissions 
that the rule either be abolished or restricted to non-commercial cases or 
cases involving payment of money. The majority offered three main 
justifications against the abolishment of the penalty rule with Lords 
Mance and Hodge offering largely similar reasons. In examining these 
                                                 
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid [82]. 
45 Ibid [99].  
46 Ibid [100]. 
47 Ibid [36].  
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justifications, which I shall term the “prevalence”, “protectionist”, and the 
“legal consistency” justifications, I respectfully address the first two and 
explain why they are not a convincing account for the continued existence 
of the rule. I put forth my support for the third justification, a justification 
that I will further develop in Part III.  
Regarding the prevalence justification, the Supreme Court Justices 
noted that that rule is not only long-standing in English law but is 
common to all major systems of law with those of the United States, 
Germany, France, Switzerland, Belgium, and Italy provided as 
examples.48 It is perhaps unfortunate that the court did not elaborate 
further upon this line of reasoning. Whilst uniformity amongst the law of 
contracts internationally may be an important consideration, it is far from 
a trump reasoning for upholding the penalty rule. On account of the 
brevity of their Lordships’ explanation and the lack of analysis as to why 
other legal jurisdictions continue to apply the penalty rule, it appears that 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning is analogous to lemmings following each 
other off a cliff. There certainly was an opportunity to have salvaged this 
argument. For example, Colman J in the case of Lordsvale clearly argued 
that the penalty rule ought not to apply on the facts of that case (an 
interest clause upon default) because inconsistency between the law 
applicable in London and New York would have been a great disservice to 
international banking.49  
The protectionist justification concerns gaps in statutory regulation 
and the protection of parties not covered by either the UCTA or the 
UTCCR: “there are major areas, notably non-consumer contracts, which 
are not regulated by statute.”50 This justification, whilst normatively 
sound, is not entirely consistent with the court’s application of the penalty 
clause in recent cases. As Professor Chuah contests, under the newly 
reformulated test, whether the detriment is out of all proportion to the 
legitimate interest is a very difficult threshold to cross (he believes the 
standard to be much higher than mere unreasonable)51 and thus it seems 
unlikely that the courts can afford the legal protection that they have 
promised under this justification. Revisiting modern penalty clause 
authorities later on, I show that the courts have rarely found a clause to be 
a penalty, with only one lone instance where a small business was 
protected. Thus the second justification leads to an unhealthy divergence 
between what the court claims the penalty rule can accomplish and what it 
                                                 
48 Ibid [36]. 
49 Lordsvale (n 12) 767.  
50 Makdessi (SC) (n 1) [38]. 
51 J Chuah, ‘Penalty Clauses - A Clarification of Principle’ [2016] Student Law 
Review 48. 
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in practice does accomplish - and actions always speak louder than words. 
For such reasons, the second justification is not entirely satisfactory. 
Before discussing the final legal consistency justification, we might 
note Lord Mance’s reasoning where his Lordship starts from the contrary 
position holding that “there would have to be shown the strongest reasons 
for so radical a reversal of jurisprudence which goes back over a century 
in its current definition and much longer in its antecedents.”52 This 
demonstration of judicial conservatism is understandable and might be the 
best way of understanding the thinking behind the Supreme Court’s 
reasonings, but an argument along the lines of: if it is not [completely] 
broken, don’t fix it, is itself not satisfactory for justifying the disparity 
between the rule’s existence and the rule’s application.  
Finally, the legal consistency justification maintains that the penalty 
rule is consistent with other well-established principles within English 
private law including the equity of redemption, relief from forfeiture, 
refusal to grant specific performance.53 As this paper aims to prove, not 
only does this reasoning not conflict with the rule’s restricted application, 
it is the best principled legal justification for upholding the modern 
penalty rule. The penalty rule, thus viewed a manifestation of a strand of 
private law jurisprudence, merits its existence even if, as Day argues, the 
rule is now “de facto extinct”.54  
 
5 PART II: THE MODERN PENALTY RULE 
 
The penalty rule has been applied few and far between since Colman 
J’s decision in Lordsvale: Professor Peel (discussing the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Makdessi) noted: “such a finding [of a penalty 
clause] is a rare event and the decision is worthy of note for this feature 
alone …”55 whereas Jackson J in Alfred McAlpine commented: “Looking 
at the bundle of authorities provided … I note only four cases where the 
relevant clause has been struck down as a penalty.”56 The modern penalty 
rule, delineated by what Christopher Clarke LJ terms the “new approach”, 
has, as a matter of authority shifted English law towards a laissez-faire 
approach towards agreed damages clauses within the commercial context. 
The Supreme Courts decision in Makdessi was an affirmation and 
continuation of this development.  
                                                 
52 Makdessi (SC) (n 1) [162].  
53 Makdessi (SC) (n 1) [39]. 
54 W Day ‘A Pyrrhic Victory for the Doctrine against Penalties: Makdessi v 
Cavendish Square Holding BV’ [2016] Journal of Business Law 115. 
55 Peel (n 17) 365.  
56 Alfred McAlpine Capital Projects v Tilebox [2005] EWHC 281 (TCC) [48]. 
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5.1 The Penalty Rule’s Development   
 
5.1.1 Modern Origins - Lordsvale Finance   
 
Professor Macfarlane and Christopher Clarke LJ consider Lordsvale 
as the inception of the modern approach. 57 In that case it was held there 
was no reason to strike down a clause as a penalty if in the circumstances 
the clause could be explained as “commercially justifiable” provided that 
the dominant purpose was not to deter the other party from breach.58  
Lordsvale concerned two syndicated loan agreements entered into by 
the defendant Bank of Zambia. It is important to note the international 
nature of these transactions: the original syndicate was entered into by 
banks led by Sumitomo (based in Japan) and the now defunct BCCI 
(founded by a Pakistani financier) with of course, the defendant Bank of 
Zambia (the country’s central bank). The loan sums were both calculated 
in American dollars at $100m and $130m. The international emphasis is 
important for contextualising the decision and understanding the penalty 
rule’s shift in emphasis as a result of the exigencies of international parties 
conducting business in England. As Colman J recognised in his decision, 
the disputed clauses in the case were of “considerable importance for 
English banking law”.59 
On the facts, both loan agreements provided that in the event of 
default, not only was the defendant required to pay an interest rate of 
1.5% during the default period, but an additional and unexplained 1 per 
cent, amounting to a total 2.5% interest rate. The defendants contended 
this additional one percent to be a penalty and in terrorem as its sole 
function was to ensure compliance with the loan agreements. Colman J 
disagreed, holding that, whilst an additional one percent in interest was 
not a genuine pre-estimate and entailed an element of deterrence, the 
disputed clauses were not penalties.60  
This case is firstly an excellent example of the tension between the 
penalty rule’s jurisdiction and the flexibility required by modern 
commerce. On one hand Colman J’s interpretation and endorsement of 
commercial justifiability might seem to poke a large and unsettling hole in 
                                                 
57 B Macfarlane, ‘Penalties and Forfeiture’ in J McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity, 
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Lord Dunedin’s second proposition. On the other hand, a contrary 
decision would have gone against the common practice of loan 
agreements charging higher default interest rates (which parties are 
otherwise perfectly entitled to contract into).61 Colman J noted London to 
be “one of the greatest centres of international banking in the world” and 
that the courts of New York were prepared to enforce such “prevalent 
provisions”.62 If we recall the “Big Bang” deregulation of the financial 
markets under the Thatcher government and its following developments a 
decade earlier, Colman J’s concept of commercial justification might be 
viewed as aligning the law with commercial practice.  
The second point is that Lordsvale is an instance of a judge 
considering factors not strictly relevant for determining whether the clause 
was a genuine pre-estimate. This admission of broader considerations 
allows for judicial maneuver: for example Colman J reasoned the 
additional interest rate applicable upon the defendant’s default to be 
proportionate by taking into account that a borrower with bad credit, (i.e. 
the Bank of Zambia in default) would incur more expensive costs for 
borrowing than a borrower who has good credit. The result from 
Lordsvale is that the courts will not only focus on the question of a 
genuine pre-estimate, but also on the wider question of whether there is a 
legitimate commercial justification. The concept that delineates the 
modern rule unfortunately is also the problem that has plagued it. How 
much a court must focus on commercial justifications in relation to 
deterrence is uncertain, and depending on how one frames this question, if 
asked at all, will invariably lead to differing results as evident in recent 
case law.  
 
5.1.2 Court of Appeal Approval  
 
In the two decades since Lordsvale, the English courts, influenced by 
the concept of commercial justifiability, have not found the disputed 
clauses to be penalties in the majority of cases.63 An important judicial 
endorsement of Colman J’s decision comes from Mance LJ in Cine Bes 
where the Court of Appeal gave credence to the concept of commercial 
                                                 
61 J MacCarthy, ‘Loan Agreements: Default Interest’ (1996) 11(7) Journal of 
International Business and Law 144.  
62 Lordsvale (n 12), 767.  
63 Bluewater Energy v Mercon Steel [2014] EWHC 2132 (TCC); Lancore v 
Barclays Bank [2008] EWHC 1264 (Ch); E-Nik v Department for Communities 
and Local Government [2012] EWHC 3027 (Comm); Associated British Ports v 
Ferryways [2008] EWHC 1265 (Comm); Steria v Sigma Wireless [2008] BLR 
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justifiability. The importance of the case also lies with Mance LJ’s finding 
that a part of the disputed clause (enforcement costs incurred from prior 
litigation between the parties) “was understandable in the overall context 
of the settlement of [their] prior litigation” and therefore not penal.64 Cine 
Bes was also the first time a Lord Justice of Appeal unequivocally 
believed that the popularised dichotomy from Dunlop to be rigid and 
obsolescent. In this way the decision, whilst not necessarily 
comprehensive, serves as an important steppingstone away from the rule’s 
ancient origins towards its modern, and rational form. The following year 
Arden, Clarke and Buxton LJJ in Murray v Leisureplay unanimously 
approved of the approaches taken in Lordsvale and Cine Bes.65 Arden LJ 
included the justification element in her “practical step by step guide” to 
penalty clauses as a part of the court’s final inquiry stage: where the 
claimant can prove that the agreed amount payable does not constitute a 
genuine pre-estimate, the court should ask whether there was some reason 
that could justify the discrepancy between the amount payable under the 
clause and the amount payable under common law damages.66 Buxton LJ 
(with whom Clarke LJ agreed) took a broader approach than that of Arden 
LJ, re-examined the House of Lord’s decision in Dunlop, and put forth an 
explanation of Dunlop in commercial rather than deterrent terms, 
emphasising the need to look at any disputed clause in its commercial 
context.67 This disagreement, which Christopher Clarke LJ (wrongly) 
believed to be not …as marked as it might appear …”68 is indicative of the 
troubles that judges have faced in framing the commercial justification 
concept. The Supreme Court recently clarified the issue and affirmed 
Buxton LJ’s wide approach, disagreeing with Arden LJ in treating 
commercial justification as evidence that the clause was not intended to 
deter.69  
 
5.1.3 A Prevalent Judicial Attitude 
 
Whilst the speeches of Mance LJ in Cine Bes and Arden LJ in Murray 
are the most recognised, the post-Lordsvale sentiment of a restrained 
penalty rule is equally evident in other decisions. For example, Jackson J 
in Alfred McAlpine explained that “the courts, are predisposed, where 
possible, to uphold contractual terms which fix the level of damages for 
                                                 
64 Cine Bes (n 27) [33] (Italics supplied). 
65 [2005] ECWA Civ 963, IRLR 946.  
66 Ibid [54]. 
67 Ibid [118].  
68 Makdessi (CA) (n 5) [124]. 
69 Makdessi (SC) (n 1) [28]. 
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breach …”70 and held that a liquidated damages clause for £45,000 a week 
in damages in a building contract not to be a penalty, whilst Burton J in M 
& J Polymers made the finding that the “take or pay clause was 
commercially justifiable …, and did not have the predominant purpose of 
deterring a breach of contract.”71  
The courts have reached the same conclusion against the finding of a 
penalty in cases concerning demurrage clauses,72 agreed damage clauses 
in employment contracts,73 as well as in yacht construction contracts.74 
Beatson J’s remarks in General Trading perfectly reflects the changed 
attitude of the courts:     
 
At the outset of the hearing I inclined to the view that this clause 
inserted, at the very end of the negotiations, was penal because of 
the size of the difference between the amount of the loan to be 
guaranteed and the amount of the loan notes that would be 
cancelled. In the light of the evidence, however, and the broader 
approach of Buxton and Clarke LJJ in Murray v Leisureplay, I am 
satisfied that it is not.75  
 
To drive home the point, there have been a series of cases where the 
court, whilst not finding the contested clause(s) to engage the penalty rule, 
nevertheless held obiter that they would not have found the clause to be 
penal had it fallen with the scope of the rule.76 It is clear that, as a starting 
point, the modern penalty rule has been very limited in its application. 
Establishing this as the norm, we can examine the rare instances where the 
courts have found a clause to be penal post-Lordsvale as to whether they 





                                                 
70 Alfred McAlpine (n 56) [47](3).  
71 M & J Polymers v Imerys Minerals [2008] EWHC 344 (Comm) [46].  
72 Mediterranean Shipping v Cottonex Anstlat [2015] EWHC 283 (Comm), 
[2015] 1 CLC 143. 
73 Tullett Prebon v Ghaleb [2008] EWHC 1929 (QB). 
74 Azimut Benetti v Darrell Healey [2010] EWHC 2234 (Comm). 
75 The General Trading Company v Richmond Corporation [2008] EWHC 1479 
(Comm) [133].  
76 Ibid; Euro London v Claessens International [2006] EWCA Civ 385;  Henning 
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5.2 Exceptions or Misconceptions?  
 
In analysing the decisions where the court did make a finding of a 
penalty, this paper will avoid Jobson v Johnson 77 and Workers Trust v 
Dojap 78 as both cases concern the penalty rule’s relationship with the 
relief from forfeiture, an area that the Supreme Court considers 
unresolved. 79 Similarly, this paper will only examine post-Lordsvale case 
law, omitting preceding decisions such as Bridge v Campbell Discount 
and Lombard North, as subsequent developments have notably altered the 
interpretation of Dunlop and the penalty rule.80 It is submitted that the 
three authorities that we will reexamine in Jeancharm, County Leasing 
and Unaoil, 81 are instances where the commercial justification was either 
not applied or misapplied and that with an accurate application of the 
modern rule, these clauses would be upheld as enforceable liquidated 
damages and a fortiori would be upheld under the new Supreme Court 
test, which demonstrated above, is harder for proving a penalty clause.  
 
5.2.1 Jeancharm v Barnet Football Club [2003] 
 
Jeancharm is the first significant finding of a penalty clause since the 
shift in Lordsvale. The case concerned an agreement for the supply of 
football kit from Jeancharm to Barnet. The contract contained a late 
payment provision where 45 days after the payment date, Barnet would 
incur interest at the rate of 5% per week on any outstanding sums. There 
was also significantly a reciprocal obligation on Jeancharm within that 
same clause that Barnet would be entitled to a late penalty of 20 pence per 
garment per day; a total of 5,000 replicas had been ordered for each of the 
1999/2000 and 2000/2001 seasons.82 The Court of Appeal unanimously 
held the clause to be a penalty.  
First and foremost Jeancharm was decided after the High Court’s 
decision in Lordsvale but before Cine Bes and Murray where the concept 
of commercial justifiability gained widespread judicial acceptance. In 
Jeancharm, Jacob J, delivering the leading judgment, relied exclusively on 
Lord Dunedin’s formulation of genuine pre-estimate as the determinative 
factor as to whether a clause was to be regarded as penal. 83 Whilst 
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80 See also the Australian High Court decision in Andrews (n 8).  
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Lordsvale was discussed, Jacob J interpreted Colman J’s dicta narrowly 
and considered the decision justified only on the basis that on those facts 
“…the borrower was a risky borrower”.84  
Consequently, the reciprocal obligation on Jeancharm within the 
clause had not been given adequate consideration. Within the modern 
approach, provisions within a clause are generally weighed as a whole. 
For example, in Azimutt-Benetti, the court rejected submissions that the 
clause was a penalty because although “the clause places an obligation on 
the buyer, … it also places an obligation on the builder”.85 Similarly in 
Murray, Arden LJ considered that the disputed clause had advantages for 
both sides.86 The same conclusion could have been reached here - 
Jeancharm was obligated under that same clause to a penalty of 20 pence 
per garment per day had it been late in its delivery. Thus, the purpose of 
the clause, to use the words of Blair J in Azimutt-Benetti, was “to strike, 
or seek to strike, a balance between the interests of the parties”.87 
Reinterpreted in this way, the clause would certainly not be deemed a 
penalty. Interestingly, even before the modern approach had fully 
developed, commentators had considered Jeancharm to be “an exceptional 
case”.88 
 
5.2.2 County Leasing v East [2007] 
 
In this case, the defendant Mr East, had entered into a long-term 
business loan with County Leasing Ltd., a company directed by Mr and 
Mrs Kirkpatrick (who were also majority shareholders of the company). 
East and the Kirkpatricks had known each other for over 25 years and had 
“done business on many occasions”.89 The loan agreement contained a 
certain clause 5 where, upon a failure to pay a specified instalment within 
7 days of its due date, East would be liable to repay the principal and all 
interest over duration of the term of the loan (20 years).90 At the time of 
East’s default, the principle amount outstanding was £378,000 and 
repayment with interest would have cost East £1.2 million. 91 The High 
Court judge deemed clause 5 to be a penalty and unenforceable, relying 
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87 Ibid [76] 
88 H Lal, ‘Liquidated Damages’ [2009] Construction Law Journal 569, 571.  
89 County Leasing (n 13) [5].  
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solely on Lords Dunedin and Parmoor’s speeches in Dunlop and obiter 
dicta by Sir Donaldson MR in The Angelic Star.92 There are two paths 
around this decision, neither which compromise our argument: the first is 
to argue that County Leasing was decided without a proper understanding 
of the modern approach, the second is to confine the case to its facts - 
accepting County Leasing to be a commercial case concerning the penalty 
rule, but to take nuanced view that this decision was reached in light of 
East conducting business as a sole trader as opposed to through a limited 
company. 
Regarding the judge’s reasoning, counsel for the claimant cited neither 
Cine Bes or  Murray as authority but rather relied on the Consumer Credit 
Act 1974, arguing that the clause was not an “an extortionate credit 
bargain” and thus not a penalty.93 It was however  emphasised that East 
was an experienced businessman, had entered into agreements with very 
similar terms as clause 5 with the claimants before, had access to legal 
advice before contracting and had been warned specifically by letter by 
County Leasing to take legal advice before entering into the agreement.94 
The judge failed to take such consideration into account and that the 
contract was freely entered into by parties of comparable bargaining 
power who had entered into similar agreements for many years. Nor did 
the judge consider whether the “predominant purpose” of the clause was 
to deter breach, taking into account any possible commercial 
justifications, before he made the finding of a penalty clause.  
The decision was largely based on brief obiter dicta in The Angelic 
Star, a shipping case decided itself exclusively premised on the rigid 
dichotomy (“proposition 2 in the speech of Lord Dunedin”)95 developed 
from Dunlop, a dichotomy that we criticised in Part I, was equally 
doubted in Murray and largely discarded by the Supreme Court in 
Makdessi.96 
Alternatively, we might give the judge the benefit of the doubt and 
reconsider County Leasing not as a true commercial case. If we view this 
case more so a consumer case as opposed to a commercial one, one would 
certainly consider any oppression as more oppressive towards East in 
principle. Because East contracted into the loan agreement as a sole trader 
(as opposed to via a limited company) he was personally liable for any 
losses incurred, not having benefitted from limited liability had he formed 
and incorporated a company, the finding of a penalty clause can be 
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justified since potential personal bankruptcy is arguably more severe than 
a potentially failed business. Furthermore, to elaborate on a point by 
Zimmermann, 97 because an agreed damages clause places the debtor 
under a conditional obligation that is to take place in the future, the natural 
confidence in one’s ability to render performance often leads one to 
underrate the often gravely detrimental nature of a clause; on this view, 
the hubris and error of one sole trader may be viewed as more deserving 
of relief from the penalty rule than that of a larger company with multiple 
directors benefitting from limited liability.  
 
5.2.3 Unaoil v Leighton Offshore [2014]  
 
Unaoil is the most recent instance of a judicial finding of a penalty 
clause taking place after the Court of Appeal’s decision in Makdessi but 
before the Supreme Court’s overturning of that decision upon appeal. It is 
an exemplary example of the inconsistent emphasis placed on the concept 
of commercial justification.  
Unaoil concerned a memorandum of agreement between Leighton 
Offshore Ltd, a contractor and Unaoil Ltd, a subcontractor. Both parties 
agreed that Leighton would appoint Unaoil as its subcontractor for the 
onshore construction work if it succeeded in its bid for a substantial oil 
infrastructure project in Iraq.98 The agreement however also contained an 
agreed damages clause, clause 8.1, stipulating that if Leighton did procure 
the oil project but did not adhere to the terms of their subcontract 
agreement, i.e. appoint Unaoil as its subcontractor, it would pay an agreed 
amount of $40 million US Dollars to Unaoil. Notably, the contract was 
amended afterwards, reducing the contract price from $75 million to $55 
million dollars in a final attempt to make Leighton’s bid more 
competitive; clause 8.1 however remained unaltered. Leighton won the 
bid but eventually elected not to appoint Unaoil as its subcontractor. 
Unaoil sought to enforce the agreed damages clause whilst Leighton 
argued that it was a penalty. Eder J found the clause to be “extravagant 
and unconscionable with a predominant function of deterrence [sic] 
without any other commercial justification for the clause”.  
The most cogent criticism against this decision is the inadequate focus 
on the commercial realities of the agreement. Eder J acknowledged, but 
did not address, the inclusion of the clause as a counterbalance to certain 
risks as a possible justification: in the course of evidence the Chairman of 
Unaoil, when questioned as to how the liquidated damages amount was 
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calculated, explained that “‘in Iraq estimates are not estimates. Things 
change…I just take a view and go forward’’ and “that the clause was 
considered a ‘sort of insurance for high profit in an area where other 
people see a perceived high risk.’”99  
A separate criticism is that Eder J premises his decision on how $40 
million as an agreed damages would have been a genuine pre-estimate of 
the loss and not a penalty had the contract price remained at $75 million 
and hence if the contract price was reduced, it could no longer be a 
genuine pre-estimate and thus a penalty.100 The judge importantly 
conceded “the reason why the figure…was not reduced at the same time 
was not explained … Perhaps … a mistake or an oversight. I do not 
know.”101 Both parties clearly had the opportunity to amend the clause 8 
when amending the contract price and having not done so, by all accounts 
had still agreed to the clause. Yet without firmly establishing the clause 
was either due to an oversight (or mistake), Eder J provided Leighton with 
a very generous benefit of the doubt, at odds with the modern penalty rule 
and the predisposition that the courts are to uphold contractually fixed 
damages for breach; Jackson J notably reiterated in Alfred McAlpine that 
such a “predisposition is even stronger in the case of commercial contracts 
freely entered into between parties of comparable bargaining power.” 102 
The Unaoil decision is disappointingly stultifying and certain 
commentators have described the decision as a “trap for the wary”.103 
 
5.3 Final Words 
 
An understanding of the penalty rule’s modern development has 
shown that the rule is in keeping with the needs of commercial parties. 
The new Supreme Court test in Makdessi has clarified that broader 
interests (including commercial) need to be given adequate consideration. 
Any concerns over legal uncertainty and inconsistent application have 
thus been alleviated, and any remaining concerns that might arise from the 
overly cautious can be answered by shrewd drafting around the doctrine 
by either making any sums payable on an event other than breach or to 
frame the clause as a primary obligation. 
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6 PART III:  A MODERN RATIONALISATION   
 
It is important to note that commercial parties are not concerned with 
the existence or abolishment of the penalty rule either way: the 
businessman almost exclusively wishes to know whether agreed damages 
contained in his contract will be upheld by the courts or deemed 
unenforceable as a penalty (and if so, how he might protect himself); 104 
earlier discussions should hopefully have assuaged his concerns that the 
courts rarely make the finding of a penalty in commercial contracts. The 
rare finding of a penalty, however, does not mean the rule has entirely lost 
its bite; Lord Halsbury’s example of a penalty payment of a million 
pounds for a building contract worth fifty pounds would in all likelihood 
still be deemed a penalty clause.105  
The discussion here is primarily academic and aims to answer the 
pundit’s inquiry: if the penalty rule is scarcely used, why not abolish it 
altogether? The answer lies beyond the rule itself and in an examination of 
other areas of private law.  
Within English private law, the modern penalty rule is not only not an 
anomaly, but is perfectly coherent and should be rationalised as a 
manifestation of important principles within the law of obligations. This is 
a bold and arduous disagreement with Diplock LJ in Robophone who 
described the rule as “anomalous” and famously declared: “I make no 
attempt, where so many others have failed, to rationalise this common law 
rule. It seems to be sui generis.”106 The penalty rule encapsulates three 
related principles that we will summarise as the aversion towards 
oppression, punishment and unfairness. 
Consistency within the law is intrinsically valuable: support for the 
current English position on punitive damages, specific performance and 
unjust enrichment logically lends support to the existence of a penalty rule 
as they rest upon the same three principles encapsulated by the penalty 
rule. Supporting one but not the other is analogous to having a window 
removed from one’s home and leaving a hole in the wall; when a storm 
comes, even if all the other windows are shut, their effectiveness in 
keeping the room dry will be greatly diminished.107  
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This paper will not discuss the equity of redemption or relief from 
forfeiture as noted by the Supreme Court,108 but the analysis can equally 
be extended to such doctrines. 
 
6.1 The Law on Specific Performance 
 
The order for specific performance is an equitably remedy granted at 
the discretion of the courts. Chitty defines specific performance as “the 
remedy available in equity to compel a person actually to perform a 
contractual obligation.”109 This remedy however is rare in practice and 
even rarer in commercial cases.110 Furthermore it will not be binding on 
the courts even if parties agree to it in the contract as “it is not the function 
of the court to be a rubber stamp”.111  
Lord Hoffmann’s judgment in Co-operative Insurance Society v 
Argyll Stores (Argyll) sheds light onto English law’s reluctance towards 
specific performance.112 There are references to all three principles in his 
Lordship’s speech. Without explicitly acknowledging anti-oppression as 
its proper basis for limiting specific performance, it is a sentiment 
prevalent throughout the judgment. In explaining “constant supervision” 
as a reason why courts should limit granting specific performance, Lord 
Hoffmann explained that due to the “heavy handed nature” of the court’s 
power (its enforcement mechanism of finding the defendant in contempt 
of court), it would be unacceptable to make the defendant run his business 
under the “sword of Damocles”.113 Perhaps his Lordship may have fared 
better to acknowledge anti-oppression as a separate reason for limiting 
specific performance,114 but the principle against oppression was evidently 
a factor behind his decision.  
Further on, his Lordship acknowledges that whilst undoubtedly it is 
the defendant has put himself in such a position by his breach of contract, 
“the purpose of the law of contract is not to punish wrongdoing …”115 
This is equally consistent with the law’s position on punitive damages. 
Whilst English law’s current position on specific performance has its 
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critics, even critics such as Rowan who have persuasively argued in 
favour of upholding agreed remedies, acknowledge there is some force to 
this principle against oppression, especially when the specific 
performance sought is personal in character such as in employment 
contracts.116   
 
6.2 The Law on Punitive Damages  
 
Punitive (or exemplary, vindictive) damages go beyond normal 
compensatory damages as a form of punishment against the defendant. 
Specifically Addis v Gramophone established that punitive damages could 
not be recovered for breach of contract.117 The House of Lord’s decision 
in Rookes v Barnard clarified the law regarding punitive damages for civil 
wrongs laying down only two narrow categories where punitive damages 
could be recovered at common law;118 in any case, punitive damages have 
been described by McGregor as “effectively outlawed”.119 Lord Devlin, in 
his leading judgment, expressed three considerations for the court’s to 
consider regarding exemplary damages and the second is especially of 
note. In his second consideration, his Lordship found that exemplary 
damages often amount to greater punishment had the conduct actually 
been criminal, and this would all have been imposed without the 
safeguard that criminal law provides an offender with (e.g. right to trial by 
jury).  Lord Reid’s speech in Broome v Cassell echoes this sentiment: “to 
allow pure punishment in this way [exemplary damages] contravenes 
almost every principle which has been evolved for the protection of 
offenders”.120 Professor Street similarly identified as a critique against 
exemplary damages that, the “sharp cleavage between criminal law … and 
the law of torts and contract … is a cardinal principle of our legal 
system.”121  
Reflecting back on penalty clauses, there is certainly a common 
underpinning between exemplary damages and Lord Neuberger and 
Sumption’s comment in Makdessi that: “the innocent party can have no 
proper interest in simply punishing the defaulter”.122 Rowan believes that 
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the introduction of exemplary damages for breach of contract would 
require the reconsideration of other rules within contract law, including 
the penalty rule and the restricted availability of specific performance, 
amongst others.123 Comparing the penalty rule with punitive damages, 
Rowan believes “this [penalty rule] [similarly] constitutes a resounding 
rejection of deterrence and punishment as acceptable aims in the law of 
contract.”124  
 
6.3 The Law of Unjust Enrichment  
 
The English legal position against unfairness links the penalty rule 
with infrequent specific performance and the law of unjust enrichment. It 
is a qualified notion however, as Lord Roskill explains: “it is not and 
never has been for the courts to relieve a party from the consequences of 
what may in the event prove to be an onerous or possibly even a 
commercially imprudent bargain.”125 Within the penalty rule, the principle 
against unfairness is subsidiary, applicable only to secondary obligations 
in the same way there will normally be no claim in unjust enrichment so 
long as a contract subsists.126  
The principle against unfairness, that no party, even though innocent, 
should be allowed to unfairly enrich himself at the expense of another, 
underlies quantum meruit claims in void contracts such as Mohammed v 
Alaga 127 and in cases of non-existent contracts 128 and is a longstanding 
principle of English law that can be traced as far back to the 18th century 
foundational case of Moses v Macferlan.129  
Even where the claimant is in breach, the innocent party is not 
allowed to retain the benefits if not provided for under the contract. For 
example in Dies v British and International Mining, Stable J allowed the 
recovery of part of the purchase price by the claimants who, in breach of 
contract, refused to take delivery of goods and pay the rest of the purchase 
price. Stable J’s fortified his view by referencing the penalty rule, and 
explained that it would be a “manifest defect in the law” if the vendor 
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could retain both the goods and the money irrespective of whether the 
money corresponded to the amount of actual damages.130  
This principle is equally evident behind the restricted availability of 
specific performance. In Argyll, Lord Hoffmann was convinced (by 
Millett LJ’s reasoning) to refuse specific performance due to the injustice 
that might arise “by allowing the plaintiff to enrich himself at the expense 
of the claimant” because the “loss which the defendant may suffer through 
having to comply with the order … may be far greater than the plaintiff 




We have thus come full circle. Initial doubts over the penalty rule 
have emerged into an appreciation of the rule’s modern role and 
underlying justifications.  
Part I examined the background leading to the Supreme Court 
decision in Makdessi and the judgment itself. It was argued that the 
reformulated test would be a high threshold for parties attempting to prove 
that a clause was penal. The justifications offered against abolishing the 
doctrine were not altogether convincing and the “legal consistency” 
justification required furthered elaboration.  
Part II considered the origins and development of the “modern” 
penalty rule. The decisions in Cine Bes and Murray firmly established 
commercial justifications as a factor when arguing over the penalty rule 
before the courts. As a matter of authority, the courts have almost entirely 
refrained from applying the rule. The varying emphasis placed on the 
aspect of commercial justification however, had unfortunately led to its 
inconsistent application with its entailing legal uncertainty; we reconciled 
the three isolated instances with the modern norm. 
Part III rationalised the rule’s continued existence in spite of its 
limited application. It was shown that the penalty rule is not anomalous, 
but rather a constituent of a rational set of private law principles. Brief 
discussions and comparisons were made with English law’s position on 
specific performance, punitive damages, and certain forms of unjust 
enrichment.  
To contrast Professor Teitel's remarks in 1988 that the penalty rule, 
which lacked the certainty of enforcement yet placed an undue premium 
on draftsmanship, gets the “worst of both worlds”,132 the modern penalty 
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rule by delineating its narrow application allows commercial parties to 
freely conduct business and include agreed damage clauses in their 
contracts as needed without undue fear of judicial intervention. On a 
theoretical level, the rule aligns itself with other doctrines within private 
law and serves as a lighthouse, illuminating important principles that run 
through the English law of obligations.  
 
